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NOTES
achieve it judicially. It would seem that the best way to achieve
the dual goals of equity and uniformity would be for Congress
to pass pervasive legislation equalizing the legal rights and
remedies for all offshore workers on fixed or submersible rigs,
both within and without state territorial waters. It is hoped
that the Rodrigue and Huson decisions will point out the desir-
ability, if not the necessity, of definitively establishing a general
body of law covering these workers and others injured or killed
while on the continental shelf.
Alvin Michael Dufilho
RELATION OF PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS TO
THE COMMUNITY: A NEED FOR REVISION
In Louisiana, the relation of personal injury awards to the
community of acquets and gains is regulated by articles 2334
and 2402 of the Civil Code. Several recent decisions in this area
show a profound need for legislative revision.
In Chambers v. Chambers judgment in district court was
rendered decreeing that a sum of money obtained after a judg-
ment of divorce, but in settlement for personal injuries sustained
by the husband during the existence of his marriage, was com-
munity property and that the plaintiff wife was entitled to one
half of this judgment. The husband appealed from this judg-
ment. In overturning the decision below, the First Circuit Court
of Appeal conceded that "[Civil Code] Article 2334 is the source
article on the subject with respect to the husband's rights and
this article is clear, unambiguous, and represents the solemn
expression of the Legislative will. '2 That article declares: "Ac-
tions for damages resulting from offenses and quasi-offenses
suffered by the husband, living separate and apart from his wife
by reason of fault on her part, sufficient for separation or di-
vorce shall be his separate property." Furthermore, "[c]ommon
property is that which is acquired by husband and wife during
marriage, in any manner different from that above stated."
Nevertheless, the court stated that "our appreciation of [Civil
Code] Article 2334, in light of the particular facts of this case,
1. 238 So.2d 30 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
2. Id. at 34.
3. A. CIv. CODM art. 2334.
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does not dictate such a harsh and inequitable result as would
follow the judgment now appealed. '4 In the opinion of the court,
the settlement should have been itemized to afford some basis to
allocate what portion thereof was attributed to pain and suffer-
ing, disability, loss of earnings and medical expenses up to the
date the husband filed a reconventional demand for divorce.
This group of compensable items would fall into the community
while compensation for subsequent and future pain and suffering
and future loss of earnings would belong to the husband alone.
A similar case, Alfred v. Alfred,5 decided by the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal less than a month before Chambers, reached
the same result. There the court ordered that the judgment of
the trial court, which stated that the personal injury damages
were part of the community, be amended by limiting the com-
munity's share of the pending law suit to those damages which
accrued prior to the dissolution of the community of acquets
and gains.
Although the results reached by these decisions are equit-
able, they have no basis in codified law. Article 2334 of the Civil
Code calls for damage awards for personal injury to the husband
to fall into the community of acquets and gains with but one
exception which does not apply to these cases.6 Under articles
2334 and 2402 of the Civil Code, all claims for the wife's personal
injuries are her separate property; the husband's claim for per-
sonal injuries falls into the community.7 To gain insight into the
rationale of the courts' decisions in Chambers and Alfred, it is
necessary to review the history of the applicable articles.
Prior to 1902, all actions for personal injuries to either hus-
band or wife fell into the community." Many courts seemed to
base this result on the omnibus clause of article 2314 of the Code
4. Chambers v. Chambers, 238 So.2d 30, 34 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
5. 237 So.2d 94 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
6. LA. Civ. CODS art. 2334:
"Actions for damages resulting from offenses and quasi offenses
suffered by the husband, living separate and apart from his wife, by
reason of fault on her part, sufficient for separation or divorce shall be
his separate property."
7. Previous decisions are in accord. See, e.g., McConnell v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 346 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1965); Hollinquest v. Kansas C. So. Ry.,
88 F. Supp. 905 (W.D.La. 1950); Matney v. Blue Ribbon, Inc., 202 La. 505,
12 So.2d 253 (1942).
8. Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851 (1900); Cooper
v. Cappel, 29 La. Ann. 213 (1877).
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of 1825.1 One early decision stated, "By a strict interpretation
of the Articles 2314 (2334), 2371 (2402) and 2374 (2405) all the
effects of the spouses, not satisfactorily established to have been
brought in marriage, or acquired during the marriage, by inheri-
tance or by donation made to one or the other particularily, con-
stitute the assets of the community, or partnership of acquets
and gains."'10
Article 2402 was amended by Act 68 of 1902.11 In Chambers,
the court stated that "Undoubtedly the 1902 amendment to Ar-
ticle 2402 had for its purpose the creation of additional rights
that social conditions of the time dictated. This was the com-
mencement of an era involving the civil 'emancipation' of mar-
ried women.' 2 Whatever the reason for the amendment, the
judiciary from that time began to hold that suits to recover dam-
ages for personal injuries suffered by a married woman were
her separate property and did not enter into the community.18
From the outset the Louisiana approach to the relationship
of personal injuries to the community has been different from
that taken by the two countries that have influenced Louisiana
law the most. The Louisiana system of acquets and gains is
Spanish in origin.14 Yet in the law governing the Spanish com-
munity of gains in 1803, "compensation for injuries to the part-
nership, whether for damage to persons or things, fell into the
common fund. Damages for injuries to the person or honor of
one of the spouses, however, became the separate asset of the
injured person, either on the principle of acquisition by lucra-
tive title, since the damages acquired in the injury action were
not acquired by the labor and industry of the spouse, or on the
principle of real subrogation, inasmuch as the damages could
9. LA. Civ. Cops art. 2314 (1825):
"Common property is that which is acquired by the husband and
wife during marriage, in any manner different from that above declared."
Corresponds to art. 2334 of LA. Civ. Coos. See Succession of McKenna, 23
La. Ann. 3869 (1871).
10. Boulingny v. Fortier, 16 La. Ann. 209, 213 (1861).
11. "But damages resulting from personal Injuries to the wife shall not
form part of this community, but shall always be and remain the separate
property of the wife and recoverable by herself alone; 'provided where the
injuries sustained by the wife result in her death, the right to recover dam-
ages shall be as now provided for by existing law."' Added to LA. CIv. CODE
art. 2402 by La. Acts 1902, No. 68.
12. Chambers v. Chambers, 238 So.2d 30, 34 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
13. McConnell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 346 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1965); Shield
v. F. Johnson & Sons Co., 132 La. 773, 61 So. 787 (1913); Harkness v. Louisi-
ana & N. W. R. R., 110 La. 822, 34 So. 791 (1903).




have been considered as given in exchange for the injury."15
There was no "all inclusive" or "omnibus" provision to bring
such awards into the community.
An "omnibus" provision such as that found in article 2334
was also lacking in the French Code Civil of 1804. Under the
French law, "an award of indemnity [for personal injury] to
one of the spouses is his separate property, whether such an
award is in one cash payment or in the form of a life annuity.
This indemnity represents the damage to the person of the in-
jured and/or a decrease in his earning capacity. Only earnings,
not earning capacity, are part of the community."' 0
Thus it appears that the omnibus clause of article 2334 was
a creation of the redactors of the Civil Code. The Civil Code
was amended several times 7 to avoid particular results of the
application of this omnibus clause, but the question of the proper
allocation of sums recovered for personal injuries was never
given adequate consideration as a whole.
The results reached in Chambers and Alfred indicate that
a general revision of the legislation on this subject is needed.
It seems rather obvious that the legislature did not envision
this type situation in amending articles 2334 and 2402. Where
a husband is awarded a large sum in damages for a ten-year
loss of future earning capacity due to a personal injury, the fact
that this sum goes into the community seems agreeable if the
community of acquets and gains continues to exist, but it
becomes clearly unjust when the community comes to an end
a few days after the damage award is granted. Surely the drafters
of these articles did not intend such an inequitable result.
A look at the present French law indicates that their handling
of personal damage awards has been sound. Article 1404 of the
present French Code reads: "The following are separate assets by
their nature, even when they have been acquired during mar-
15. Id. at 10.
16. 3 PLANIOL, CiviL LAw TREATISs no. 921 A (La. St. L. Inst. Transl. 1959).
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2402, as amended by La. Acts 1902, No. 68 to exclude
the wife's personal injury awards from the community.
LA. Civ. CODs) art. 2334, as amended by La. Acts 1912, No. 170 to exclude
property acquired with separate funds from the community. This amend-
ment also excluded from the community the earnings of the wife while
living separate and apart from husband.
LA. Civ. CoDs art. 2334, as amended by La. Acts 1920, No. 186 to grant the
husband an additional, but limited, right to have his actions for damages
declared his separate property.
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riage: ... actions for corporeal or moral damage, ... and, gen-
erally, all of the things which have a personal character and
all the rights which attach exclusively to the person."' s
Although the present Spanish Civil Code makes no specific
statement that personal damage awards are to be the separate
property of the injured spouse, it does avoid encompassing them
into the community fund by limiting what belongs to the con-
jugal partnership. 9 Article 1410 of the Spanish Civil Code also
provides that partnership property can be used to pay a separated
debt of one of the spouses, but at the time of the liquidation of
the partnership any payments made for such a cause shall be
charged to such spouse.20 If the individual debts paid by the
community are charged against the indebted spouse when the
partnership is ended, it would seem by implication that an
individual asset, such as a damage award, that has gone into
the community would also fall into the separate patrimony of
that individual spouse when the community is terminated.
Louisiana might well profit from the French or Spanish
example. No doubt the amendments to articles 2334 and 2402 of
the Louisiana Civil Code were designed to alleviate some inequity
that the articles in their original form created. At least the
earlier form of the articles treated husband and wife equally.
The present social situation between husband and wife no
longer places the wife at a disadvantage; indeed, the husband
18. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1404 (a.s amended in 1965).
"Forment des propres par leur nature, quand mgme ils auralent t6
acquis pendant le mariage, les v~tements et linges A l'usage personnel
de l'un des dpoux, les actions en r~paration d'un dommage corporel ou
moral, les cr6ances et pensions incessibles, et, et tous lea droits exclusive-
ment attaches ? la personne."
(translation by Mrs. Thomas B. Pugh.)
"The following are separate assets by their nature, even when they
have been acquired during marriage: clothing and linens used person-
ally by one of the spouses, actions for corporeal or moral damages,
credits and unassignable pensions, and generally, all of the things which
have a personal character and all the rights which attach exclusively
to the person."
19. F. FISHER, THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN WITH PHILIPPINE NOTES AND REFER-
ENCES art. 1401 (1947).
To the conjugal partnership belong:
1. Property acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage
at the expense of the common fund whether the acquisition is made
for the partnership or for one of the spouses only;
2. Property obtained by the Industry, wages or work of the spouses or
either of them;
3. The fruits, income, or interest collected or accrued during the mar-
riage derived from the partnership property, or from that which
belongs separately to either of the spouses.
20. Id. art. 1410.
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should be placed back on an equal level with the wife as far as
personal injury awards are concerned. As Judge Miller points
out in his dissent in Alfred, "The inequitable result required by
the code addresses itself to legislative action-not to a court
decision. 2 1 The court has shown that the present wording of
the Code does not facilitate justice under the particular fact
situation discussed above. It is time for the legislature to correct
this inequity.
John C. Miller
21. Alfred v. Alfred, 237 So.2d 94, 96 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
